ThreatQuotient

Atom Feed Reader CDF

Version 1.0.0

April 30, 2024

ThreatQuotient
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ThreatQ Supported

Support

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Contents

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Support

This integration is designated as **ThreatQ Supported**.

Support Email: support@threatq.com
Support Web: https://support.threatq.com
Support Phone: 703.574.9893

Integrations/apps/add-ons designated as **ThreatQ Supported** are fully supported by ThreatQuotient's Customer Support team.

ThreatQuotient strives to ensure all ThreatQ Supported integrations will work with the current version of ThreatQuotient software at the time of initial publishing. This applies for both Hosted instance and Non-Hosted instance customers.

⚠ ThreatQuotient does not provide support or maintenance for integrations, apps, or add-ons published by any party other than ThreatQuotient, including third-party developers.

Integration Details

ThreatQuotient provides the following details for this integration:

Current Integration Version	1.0.0
Compatible with ThreatQ Versions	>= 5.6.0
Support Tier	ThreatQ Supported

Introduction

The Atom Feed Reader CDF enables analysts to automatically ingest Atom feeds from multiple sources, directly into ThreatQ.

The integration provides the following feed:

- **Atom Feed Reader -** ingests Atom feeds, from multiple sources, into the ThreatQ platform.

The integration ingests the following system objects:

- Reports
- Indicators

Installation

Perform the following steps to install the integration:

> The same steps can be used to upgrade the integration to a new version.

1. Log into https://marketplace.threatq.com/.
2. Locate and download the integration yaml file.
3. Navigate to the integrations management page on your ThreatQ instance.
4. Click on the **Add New Integration** button.
5. Upload the integration yaml file using one of the following methods:
    - Drag and drop the file into the dialog box
    - Select **Click to Browse** to locate the file on your local machine

    > ThreatQ will inform you if the feed already exists on the platform and will require user confirmation before proceeding. ThreatQ will also inform you if the new version of the feed contains changes to the user configuration. The new user configurations will overwrite the existing ones for the feed and will require user confirmation before proceeding.

6. The feed will be added to the integrations page. You will still need to configure and then enable the feed.

Configuration

ThreatQuotient does not issue API keys for third-party vendors. Contact the specific vendor to obtain API keys and other integration-related credentials.

To configure the integration:

1. Navigate to your integrations management page in ThreatQ.
2. Select the **OSINT** option from the *Category* dropdown (optional).

   If you are installing the integration for the first time, it will be located under the **Disabled** tab.

3. Click on the integration entry to open its details page.
4. Enter the following parameters under the **Configuration** tab:

PARAMETER	DESCRIPTION
Atom Feeds	Enter a line-separated list of Atom feeds to ingest data from.
Parsed IOC Types	Select the IOC types to automatically parse from the content. Options include: ◦ CVE ◦ IP Address ◦ IPv6 Address ◦ CIDR Block ◦ FQDN ◦ URL ◦ MD5 ◦ SHA-1 ◦ SHA-256 ◦ SHA-512 ◦ Email Address ◦ Registry Key
Parsing Options	Select the parsing options to use when parsing IOCs from content. Options include: ◦ Normalize IOCs ◦ Derive FQDNs from URLs



Atom Feeds (One Per Line)
https://www.openssl.org/blog/atom.xml
https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/atomfeed/

Enter a line-separated list of Atom feeds to ingest posts from.

Automated Parsing

This integration offers the ability to automatically parse out IOCs from the content of the Atom feed posts. Our only warning is that certain IOC types such as URLs can produce false positives due to the nature of Atom feeds.

Parsed IOC Types

Select the IOC types you would like to automatically parse from the content. Normalization & derivation is controlled by the global platform settings.

- ☐ CVE
- ☐ IP Address
- ☐ IPv6 Address
- ☐ CIDR Block
- ☐ FQDN
- ☑ URL
- ☐ MD5
- ☐ SHA-1
- ☐ SHA-256
- ☐ SHA-512
- ☐ Email Address
- ☐ Registry Key

Parsing Options

Select the parsing options you would like to use when parsing IOCs from the content.

- ☐ Normalize IOCs
- ☑ Derive FQDNs from URLs

Disabled / Enabled

Additional Information

Integration Type: Feed

Version:

5. Review any additional settings, make any changes if needed, and click on **Save**.
6. Click on the toggle switch, located above the *Additional Information* section, to enable it.

ThreatQ Mapping

Atom Feed Reader

The Atom Feed Reader feed pulls entries from one or more Atom feeds. Entries will be parsed and uploaded to ThreatQ as Reports.

`GET https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/atomfeed/`

Sample Response:

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<feed xml:lang="en-us" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><title>CERT Recently
Published Vulnerability Notes</title><link href="https://kb.cert.org/vuls/"
rel="alternate"/><link href="https://kb.cert.org/vuls/atomfeed/" rel="self"/
><id>https://kb.cert.org/vuls/</id><updated>2024-04-18T18:47:30.440271+00:00</
updated><author><name>CERT</name><email>cert@cert.org</email><uri>https://
www.sei.cmu.edu</uri></author><subtitle>CERT publishes vulnerability advisories
called "Vulnerability Notes." Vulnerability Notes include summaries, technical
details, remediation information, and lists of affected vendors.  Many
vulnerability notes are the result of private coordination and disclosure
efforts.</subtitle><entry><title>VU#253266: Keras 2 Lambda Layers Allow
Arbitrary Code Injection in TensorFlow Models</title><link href="https://
kb.cert.org/vuls/id/253266" rel="alternate"/
><published>2024-04-16T20:16:27.223993+00:00</
published><updated>2024-04-18T18:47:30.440271+00:00</updated><id>https://
kb.cert.org/vuls/id/253266</id><summary type="html">
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        &lt;div class="large-12 columns"&gt;
          &lt;h3&gt; Vendor Information &lt;/h3&gt;

          &lt;div id="vendorinfo"&gt;
            One or more vendors are listed for this advisory. Please reference
the full report for more information.
          &lt;/div&gt;

        &lt;/div&gt;
      &lt;/div&gt;
      &lt;br/&gt;


      &lt;div class="row"&gt;
        &lt;div class="large-12 columns"&gt;
          &lt;h3&gt; References &lt;/h3&gt;
          &lt;ul&gt;
```

```
            &lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://keras.io/api/models/
model_saving_apis/model_saving_and_loading/#loadmodel-function"
class="vulreflink safereflink" target="_blank" rel="noopener"&gt;https://
keras.io/api/models/model_saving_apis/model_saving_and_loading/#loadmodel-
function&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;



            &lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/
blob/master/SECURITY.md" class="vulreflink safereflink" target="_blank"
rel="noopener"&gt;https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/blob/master/
SECURITY.md&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;



            &lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://github.com/Azure/counterfit/wiki/
Abusing-ML-model-file-formats-to-create-malware-on-AI-systems:-A-proof-of-
concept" class="vulreflink safereflink" target="_blank"
rel="noopener"&gt;https://github.com/Azure/counterfit/wiki/Abusing-ML-model-
file-formats-to-create-malware-on-AI-systems:-A-proof-of-concept&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/
li&gt;



            &lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://splint.gitbook.io/cyberblog/security-
research/tensorflow-remote-code-execution-with-malicious-model"
class="vulreflink safereflink" target="_blank" rel="noopener"&gt;https://
splint.gitbook.io/cyberblog/security-research/tensorflow-remote-code-execution-
with-malicious-model&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;



            &lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://5stars217.github.io/2023-03-30-on-
malicious-models/" class="vulreflink safereflink" target="_blank"
rel="noopener"&gt;https://5stars217.github.io/2023-03-30-on-malicious-models/
&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;



            &lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://hiddenlayer.com/research/models-are-
code/" class="vulreflink safereflink" target="_blank"
rel="noopener"&gt;https://hiddenlayer.com/research/models-are-code/&lt;/
a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;



          &lt;/ul&gt;
        &lt;/div&gt;
      &lt;/div&gt;
      &lt;h3&gt;Other Information&lt;/h3&gt;
        &lt;div class="vulcontent"&gt;
          &lt;table class="unstriped"&gt;
            &lt;tbody&gt;

              &lt;tr&gt;
                &lt;td width="200"&gt;&lt;b&gt;CVE IDs:&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
                &lt;td&gt;


                &lt;a href="http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?
vulnId=2024-3660"&gt;CVE-2024-3660  &lt;/a&gt;


                &lt;/td&gt;
              &lt;/tr&gt;

              &lt;tr&gt;
                &lt;td&gt;
                  &lt;b&gt;Date Public:&lt;/b&gt;
                &lt;/td&gt;
                &lt;td&gt;2024-02-23&lt;/td&gt;
              &lt;/tr&gt;
              &lt;tr&gt;
                &lt;td&gt;&lt;b&gt;Date First Published:&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
                &lt;td id="datefirstpublished"&gt;2024-04-16&lt;/td&gt;
              &lt;/tr&gt;
              &lt;tr&gt;
                &lt;td&gt;&lt;b&gt;Date Last Updated: &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
                &lt;td&gt;2024-04-18 18:47 UTC&lt;/td&gt;
              &lt;/tr&gt;
              &lt;tr&gt;
                &lt;td&gt;&lt;b&gt;Document Revision: &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
                &lt;td&gt;4 &lt;/td&gt;
              &lt;/tr&gt;
            &lt;/tbody&gt;
          &lt;/table&gt;
        &lt;/div&gt;
    &lt;/div&gt;
  &lt;/div&gt;
  &lt;div class="large-3 medium-3 columns" data-sticky-container&gt;
  &lt;div class="sticky" data-sticky data-anchor="content"&gt;
    &lt;div class="sidebar-links"&gt;
      &lt;ul class="menu vertical"&gt;
        &lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://vuls.cert.org/confluence/display/VIN/
Vulnerability+Note+Help" target="_blank" rel="noopener"&gt;About vulnerability
notes&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
        &lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="mailto:cert@cert.org?Subject=VU%23253266
Feedback"&gt;Contact us about this vulnerability&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
        &lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://vuls.cert.org/confluence/display/VIN/
```

```
Case+Handling#CaseHandling-Givingavendorstatusandstatement" target="_blank"
&gt;Provide a vendor statement&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
      &lt;/ul&gt;
    &lt;/div&gt;
  &lt;/div&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
</content></entry><entry><title>VU#123335: Multiple programming languages fail
to escape arguments properly in Microsoft Windows</title><link href="https://
kb.cert.org/vuls/id/123335" rel="alternate"/
><published>2024-04-10T15:13:48.856313+00:00</
published><updated>2024-04-18T13:33:28.597485+00:00</updated><id>https://
kb.cert.org/vuls/id/123335</id><summary type="html">
&lt;h2 id="overview"&gt;Overview&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Various programming languages lack proper validation mechanisms for
commands and in some cases also fail to escape arguments correctly when
invoking commands within a Microsoft Windows environment. The command injection
vulnerability in these programming languages, when running on Windows, allows
attackers to execute arbitrary code disguised as arguments to the command. This
vulnerability may also affect the application that executes commands without
specifying the file extension.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 id="description"&gt;Description&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Programming languages typically provide a way to execute commands (for
e.g., os/exec in Golang) on the operating system to facilitate interaction with
the OS. Typically, the programming languages also allow for passing
&lt;code&gt;arguments&lt;/code&gt; which are considered data (or variables) for
the command to be executed. The arguments themselves are expected to be not
executable and the command is expected to be executed along with properly
escaped arguments, as inputs to the command. Microsoft Windows typically
processes these commands using a &lt;code&gt;CreateProcess&lt;/code&gt;
function that spawns a &lt;code&gt;cmd.exe&lt;/code&gt; for execution of the
command. Microsoft Windows has documented some of the concerns related to how
these should be properly escaped before execution as early as 2011. See &lt;a
href="https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/
twistylittlepassagesallalike/everyone-quotes-command-line-arguments-the-wrong-
way"&gt;https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/
twistylittlepassagesallalike/everyone-quotes-command-line-arguments-the-wrong-
way&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A vulnerability was discovered in the way multiple programming
languages fail to properly escape the arguments in a Microsoft Windows command
execution environment.  This can lead confusion at execution time where an
expected argument for a command could be executed as another command itself. An
attacker with knowledge of the programming language can carefully craft inputs
that will be processed by the compiled program as commands. This unexpected
behavior is due to lack of neutralization of arguments by the programming
language (or its command execution module) that initiates a Windows execution
environment.  The researcher has found multiple programming languages, and
their command execution modules fail to perform such sanitization and/or
validation before processing these in their runtime environment. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 id="impact"&gt;Impact&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Successful exploitation of this vulnerability permits an attacker to
```

```
execute arbitrary commands. The complete impact of this vulnerability depends
on the implementation that uses a vulnerable programming language or such a
vulnerable module.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 id="solution"&gt;Solution&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;h4 id="updating-the-runtime-environment"&gt;Updating the runtime
environment&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Please visit the Vendor Information section so see if your programming
language Vendor has released the patch for this vulnerability and update the
runtime environment that can prevent abuse of this vulnerability. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4 id="update-the-programs-and-escape-manually"&gt;Update the programs and
escape manually&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the runtime of your application doesn't provide a patch for this
vulnerability and you want to execute batch files with user-controlled
arguments, you will need to perform the escaping and neutralization of the data
to prevent any intended command execution. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Security researcher has more detailed information in the &lt;a
href="https://flatt.tech/research/posts/batbadbut-you-cant-securely-execute-
commands-on-windows/"&gt;blog post&lt;/a&gt; which provides details on specific
languages that were identified and their Status. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 id="acknowledgements"&gt;Acknowledgements&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thanks to the reporter, &lt;a href="https://flatt.tech/research/posts/
batbadbut-you-cant-securely-execute-commands-on-windows/"&gt;RyotaK&lt;/
a&gt;.This document was written by Timur Snoke.&lt;/p&gt;
</summary><content type="html">
```

ThreatQuotient provides the following default mapping for this feed:

FEED DATA PATH	THREATQ ENTITY	THREATQ OBJECT TYPE OR ATTRIBUTE KEY	PUBLISHED DATE	EXAMPLES	NOTES	
`.entry[].title`, `.entry[].title['#text']`	Report.Value	N/A	N/A	`.updated`	`[Bug 15103] CVE-2022-1615 [SECURITY] GnuTLS gnutls_rnd() can fail and give predictable random values`	N/A
`.entry[].content`, `.entry[].content['#text']`	Report.Description	N/A	N/A	N/A	`<HTML>`	N/A
`.entry[].summary`, `.entry[].summary['#text']`	Report.Description	N/A	N/A	N/A	`<HTML>`	N/A
`.entry[].author.name`	Report.Attribute	Author	N/A	`.updated`	`OpenSSL Foundation, Inc.`	N/A
`.entry[].author.name`	Report.Source	N/A	N/A	N/A	`OpenSSL Foundation, Inc.`	N/A
N/A	Report.Source	N/A	N/A	N/A	`Atom Feed Reader`	Source applied by default
`.entry[].link['#href']`	Report.Attribute	External Reference	N/A	`.updated`	N/A	N/A
`.entry[].id`	Report.Attribute	ID	N/A	`.updated`	N/A	Only ingested if different from the `link['#href']` field.
`<Entry Title/Content>`	Report.Indicator	CVE	N/A	`.updated`	N/A	Entries are parsed for CVE IDs.

Average Feed Run

Object counts and Feed runtime are supplied as generalities only - objects returned by a provider can differ based on credential configurations and Feed runtime may vary based on system resources and load.

METRIC	RESULT
Run Time	1 minute
Reports	90
Report Attributes	200
Indicators	69

Known Issues / Limitations

- The feed utilizes **since** and **until** dates to make sure entries are not re-ingested if they haven't been updated. If you need to ingest historical posts, run the feed manually by setting the **since** date back.

Change Log

- **Version 1.0.0**
    - Initial release